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ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE -
COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION
Hunt v. Mobil Oil, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 904 (1977).
A recent federal appellate decision, Hunt v. Mobil Oil,' and a
subsequent district court decision, Bokkelin v. Grumman Airlines,2
indicate judicial uncertainty about the commercial exception to the Act-of-
State doctrine.
The Act-of-State doctrine deems nonjusticiable any claim arising
from the official acts of a foreign sovereign. 3 An exception to this doctrine
is said to arise when the sovereign's acts leading to the claim are of a
purely commercial nature. 4
1. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 904 (1977).
2. 432 F. Supp. 329 (D.C.N.Y. 1977).
3. "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
sovereign State and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of
the government of another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See e.g., American Banana v. United Fruit Company, 213
U.S. 347 (1909); Continental Ore v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
4. "IT]he concept of an act of state should not be extended to include the
repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by
one of its commercial instrumentalities." Dunhill v. Cuba, 425 U.S. at 695.
TOPICAL SURVEY
In Hunt, Libya had expropriated the plaintiffs oil fields and plaintiff
sued seven other major oil producers,5 alleging that they had conspired to
cause the expropriation. The court held that the Act-of-State doctrine
precluded judicial review because the plaintiff would have had the burden
of proving that but for the alleged conspiracy, Libya would not have
expropriated Hunt's oil fields. To prove such an allegation required an
examination of Libya's actions, which was barred by the Act-of-State
doctrine.
The Court dismissed the plaintiffs assertion that the commercial
exception was applicable, finding that expropriations of property "are
traditionally considered to be public acts of the sovereign removed from
judicial scrutiny by application of the act of state rubric."'6 While the
expropriation of Hunt's assets were clearly the political acts of a
sovereign, the application of the Act-of-State doctrine based on a
determination of whether an act is "political" or "commercial" is
confusing. Hunt provided no guidelines by which such a determination
can be made. A foreign nation may term an act "political" for
propaganda purposes, as Libya did in this case,7 yet commercial interests
were undoubtedly important motivations for Libya.
The confusion of the commercial/political act analysis is illustrated
by a New York federal district case decided after Hunt, that of Bokkelin v.
Grumman Aerospace.8 In Bokkelin, the plaintiff had contracted with the
defendant to be defendant's sole agent for aircraft sales in South
America. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant influenced Brazilian
officials to deny plaintiff an importation license. The court found that the
issuance or denial of a license is as much a sovereign act as the
expropriation in Hunt.9 Therefore, the commercial exception was inappli-
cable. 10
The Bokkelin court's reasoning seems spurious. The Brazilian denial
of the license was the equivalent of a business' refusal to contract. The
differing modes of denial do not characterize one act as "governmental/
political" and the other "commercial." The Court seems to have skirted
the commercial exception in its effort to apply the basic rationale of the
Act-of-State doctrine; i.e., the avoidance of political embarrassment. An
5. Mobil Oil Corp., Exxon Corp., Shell Petroleum Corp., Ltd., Texaco, Inc.,
Standard Oil Co. of California, British Petroleum Co., Ltd. and Gulf Oil Corp.
6. 550 F.2d at 77-78.
7. Id. at 73.
8. Supra note 1.
9. Id. at 333.
10. Id.
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inquiry would involve "the question of whether Grumman, directly or
indirectly, improperly influenced [Brazil's] decision. The answer to that
question easily might embarrass the executive branch of our government
in the conduct of our foreign relations.""
In light of Hunt and Bokkelin, there appear to be two major questions
which courts must address if the commercial exception is to be given any
substantive value. First, a decision should be made whether the
commercial exception will apply to all commercial acts by foreign
governments or only those inquiries which do not create problems in our
foreign relations. Bokkelin seems to indicate the latter policy. Second, it
should be determined which analysis a court should use in deciding
whether a foreign government's activities are of a commercial nature. The
present ambiguity allows courts to interject or withhold the exception
depending upon the sensitivity of an inquiry. Recognition that the Act-of-
State doctrine may be applicable to some commercial acts of a sensitive
nature would be, however, a more realistic assessment of the constraints
upon courts in foreign relations. Moreover, courts would then be free to
develop an analytical framework to determine whether a government's
act is commercial in nature. There would be no need for any purposeful
ambiguity; courts would know that they may still impose the Act-of-State
defense even if acts of a commercial nature be determined. The need to
define "commerical activities" as the sensitivity of the inquiry demands
would be alleviated.
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